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Abstract
We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly
interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls
the rate of arrivals and departures associated with its queue to minimize its expected
cost. The rates and the cost functions in addition to depending on the control action,
can depend, in a symmetric fashion, on the size of the individual queue and the empirical
measure of the states of all queues in the system. In order to determine an approximate
Nash equilibrium for this finite player game we construct a Lasry-Lions type mean-field
game (MFG) for certain reflected diffusions that governs the limiting behavior. Under
conditions, we establish the convergence of the Nash-equilibrium value for the finite size
queuing system to the value of the MFG.
AMS Classification: 60K25, 91A13, 60K35, 93E20, 60H30, 60F17.
Keywords: Heavy traffic limits, queuing systems, strategic servers, mean-field games, rate
control, reflected diffusions.
1 Introduction
Rate controlled queueing systems commonly arise from applications in communication systems,
see e.g. [33, 52, 6, 23] and references therein. Recently, they have also been considered in
modeling limit order books, see e.g. [11, 12, 44, 21, 17, 54]. A common approach to the
study of such rate control problems when the system is in heavy traffic is through diffusion
approximations. In a problem setting where there is interaction between servers/queues in
that the rates or costs associated with a particular queue and server can depend on the states
of the other queues, this approach leads to a stochastic control problem for n-dimensional
reflected diffusions, where n is the number of queues in the system. When n is large such
control problems are computationally intractable and in general this ‘curse of dimensionality’ is
unavoidable. However, when there are certain symmetries present and the interaction between
queues is weak, in that each queue has O(1/n) affect on any other queue in the system, a
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natural approach is to consider, in addition to heavy traffic, another asymptotic regime where
the number of queues n approaches∞ as well. Such model settings arise in many applications,
e.g., cloud computing, live streaming, limit order books, customer service systems, etc. In
many of these contexts the servers are strategic, for example, in customer service networks,
servers respond to workload incentives (see [39]), and in the context of limit order books buyers
and sellers place their orders in a strategic manner and interact weakly through their impact
on the price distribution.
We study one of the simplest forms of queuing networks, namely a collection of n single
server queues. The system is assumed to be critically loaded. For this, we fix an arbitrary
sequence of scaling parameters {en}n that satisfy en → ∞ when n → ∞. We assume that,
for each queue, the traffic intensity, which is the ratio between the rate of arrivals to the rate
of service is 1 −O(1/√en) (see [30]). The arrival and service rates for each queue are O(en).
In absence of control and state dependence of rates, the analysis simply reduces to that of a
single M/M/1 queue which in the heavy traffic can be approximated by a one dimensional
reflected Brownian motion. In the setting we consider, every server can exercise control on the
arrival and service rates associated with its own queue. This control which is O(√en) is of
lower order compared to the overall rate but it can have significant impact on performance in
the asymptotic regime we consider. In the heavy traffic regime with a fixed number of servers,
performance improvement using an O(√en) control has been well studied (see for example
[52, Chapter 9]). In a setting (that is quite different from the one considered here) where the
number of nodes/servers approach ∞, numerical results that show performance improvement
under O(√en) controls can be found in [22]. In the model we consider, the rates can depend
on the state of the individual queue, furthermore a particular queue’s state is influenced by the
remaining queue states through their empirical measure. The control action for each server
can use information on the history of queue lengths, arrival and processing times and control
actions for all the queues in the system. We consider a rate control problem where each server
aims to minimize its individual cost. Although many different types of cost criteria can be
considered, here for simplicity we consider a cost function over a finite time horizon. This cost
function may depend on the individual queue lengths, the control action, and the empirical
measure of all the queue states. A natural way to formulate optimality for such n-player
games is through the notion of a (near) Nash equilibrium. Computing Nash equilibria, even
if one considers the simplified heavy traffic approximation in terms of reflected diffusions, is
computationally a very challenging problem when n is large. The goal of this work is to analyze
an asymptotic formulation where simultaneously each queue approaches heavy traffic and the
number of queues approaches ∞. There is extensive literature on heavy traffic limits of rate
controlled queuing systems with a fixed number of queues [52, 6, 23], however to the best of
our knowledge this is the first work to study the asymptotics for controlled queues where in
addition to heavy traffic, the number of queues approach infinity as well. We will show that
the asymptotics in this regime is governed by a Lasry-Lions type mean field game (MFG) for
reflected diffusions. We will use the solution of the MFG to construct an asymptotic Nash
equilibrium for the n-player queueing system. This equilibrium has a simple and appealing
decentralized structure: each server bases his decision only upon the length of his own queue
and a deterministic measure valued function obtained from the solution of the MFG. We also
prove that the value of the above near Nash equilibrium converges to the value function of the
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MFG as n→∞. In general closed form solutions for MFG of the form that arise here are not
available and thus one needs numerical approximations. In [8] we study one such procedure
that uses the Markov chain approximation method ([53]) and establish convergence of the
scheme over a small time interval. We refer the reader to [2, 55, 42, 1, 25, 26, 15, 3, 29] for
some recent results on numerical methods for mean field games.
The theory of mean field games was initiated a decade ago in the seminal work of Lasry
and Lions [58, 59, 60], and Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [47, 46]. In recent years there
has been a growing interest in this field. For recent theoretical developments and applica-
tions of this theory see [24, 43, 38, 27, 57, 28, 56, 34] and references therein. Mean field
approximations for weakly interacting stochastic particles have a long history starting from
the works of Boltzmann, McKean, Kac and others (see [66] and references therein). Even in
the context of queuing systems and communication networks, there have been many works
[37, 7, 48, 69, 20, 40, 14, 18, 41, 5, 22]. Another related branch is agent based models with
mean-field interaction (but without strategic agents), see e.g. [36, 9, 10]. MFGs have also been
used by queuing theorists as a tool in recent years see e.g. [63, 70, 61, 54]. In contrast to these
works we consider an MFG associated with queuing systems in heavy traffic.
We now make some comments on proof techniques. Roughly speaking, solution of an MFG
considered here can be viewed as the solution of a fixed point problem on the space of probabil-
ity measures on certain path spaces (see Section 3). In order to characterize such solutions, in
a setting where each agent’s state evolution is described through a diffusion process, Lasry and
Lions [58, 59, 60] studied wellposedness of two coupled nonlinear partial differential equations;
one is an equation of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) type while the second takes the form of
a Kolmogorov forward equation. A somewhat different approach is taken in recent works of
Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker [27, 28]. Using probabilistic methods, authors characterize the
MFG solution as a solution to certain forward backward stochastic differential equations.
In all the above papers the n-player system is described through a collection of stochastic
differential equations and the mean field game gives the asymptotic behavior of the system as
n→∞. In contrast, in the current work, for a fixed value of n the state process is given through
a collection of controlled jump-Markov processes with jump sizes that approach 0 as n →∞.
Thus here we have two forms of asymptotic behavior, one corresponds to the large agent limit
while the other corresponds to diffusion approximations of pure jump processes with vanishing
jump sizes. Analyzing this simultaneous limit behavior, which is key to the proof of Theorem
4.1 that identifies an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for the n-player game as n → ∞, requires
new techniques. A key ingredient is to prove suitable tightness properties and to analyze and
characterize the weak limit points of certain stochastic processes and random measures. Here
we make use of a result from [50] (see Lemma 4.2 therein) which can be viewed as an extension
of de Finetti’s theorem for sequences of random measures on certain path spaces. In proving
suitable tightness properties of control processes we consider a relaxed control formulation. Our
assumption on the uniqueness of the minimizer (Assumption 3.1(b)) ensures that extending
the class of controls in this manner does not lower the cost. Such relaxed control formulations
have been widely used in stochastic control theory, see e.g. [35, 32, 19, 53]. More recently, they
have also been invoked in the study of mean field games [57, 56, 34]. Other key ingredients
needed for the proof are (a) regularity properties of the optimal feedback controls for certain
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stochastic control problems for reflected diffusions; (b) weak formulation of stochastic control
problems for reflected diffusions. We find that the approach based on HJB characterizations
of value functions is particularly well suited for our problem setting. In particular, regularity
results from [62] for quasilinear PDE with Neumann boundary conditions give us the required
estimates for obtaining the desired properties of the optimal feedback controls. Use of HJB
theory in our analysis is a feature that is common to the approach initiated by Lasry and
Lions, however a point of departure is that instead of using Kolmogorov forward equations we
characterize probability distributions as unique weak solutions of suitable reflected diffusions.
In this sense our approach is closer to [28] although, unlike [28], we do not make use of forward
backward stochastic differential equations in our work.
In summary our main contributions are as follows. We
• consider a rate control problem for large symmetric queuing systems in heavy traffic with
strategic servers;
• introduce an MFG for controlled reflected diffusions, and in Theorem 3.1 establish its
solvability under Assumption 3.1, and prove unique solvability assuming in addition
Assumption 3.2;
• use the solution of a diffusion MFG to construct, under Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1, an
asymptotically optimal Nash equilibrium for the n player countable state game using
techniques that combine heavy traffic analysis with large agent asymptotics (Theorem
4.1).
Thus Assumption 3.1 is a basic assumption for all our results. This assumption imposes
Lipschitz continuity of the various functions in the model. Assumption 3.2, that is introduced
for the uniqueness of the solution of the MFG, is common in the literature of MFG. It says that
the drift is independent of the mean-field term and that the running cost and terminal cost
satisfy a certain monotonicity property, see Remark 3.1 for a discussion of the assumption.
In order to obtain an asymptotic Nash-equilibrium, we require, in addition to Assumption
3.1, Assumption 4.1 which as the first part of Assumption 3.2 says that the drift is free of the
mean-field term and in addition requires a basic convergence property for the initial conditions.
For this result we do not require the monotonicity property, in particular the uniqueness of
the solution of the MFG is not needed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the queueing model, the scaling
regime and the cost criterion. Next in Section 3 we introduce the MFG and present our main
result on its solvability (Theorem 3.1). Section 4 constructs an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for
the n-player game and the main result of this section is Theorem 4.1 which proves asymptotic
optimality.
1.1 Notation
We use the following notation. For metric spaces S1,S2 denote by C(S1 : S2) the space of S2
valued continuous functions on S1. When S2 = R, we abbreviate the notation to simply C(S1).
The space C([0, T ] : S) for a Polish space S will be equipped with the uniform topology. We
will denote by D([0, T ] : S) the space of S valued functions that are right continuous and have
left limits (RCLL) defined on [0, T ]. This space is equipped with the usual Skorohod topology.
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For f ∈ D([0, T ] : Rd) and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , ‖f‖t .= sup0≤s≤t ‖f(s)‖. In case that d = 1, we often
use |f |t. We will denote by Lip1(S) the space of real Lipschitz functions on S whose Lipschitz
norm is bounded by 1, namely the class of functions f : S → R with
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ d(x, y), x, y ∈ S
where d denotes the metric on S. Denote by P(S) the space of probability measures on S. We
endow P(S) with the topology of weak convergence of measures. Convergence in distribution
of S valued random variable Xn to X will be denoted as Xn ⇒ X. For T,L ∈ (0,∞), the
space P(C([0, T ] : [0, L])) will be denoted as PT,L. The Wasserstein distance of order 1 on
P(S), where S is a compact metric space, is defined as
W1(η
′, η) = inf
{[∫
S
d(x, y)dπ(x, y)
]
: π ∈ P(S × S) with marginals η′ and η
}
,
where η, η′ ∈ P(S). We denote by C1,2([0, T ]×[0, L]) the space of functions f : (0, T )×(0, L) →
R that are continuously differentiable (resp., twice continuously differentiable) with respect to
(w.r.t.) the first (resp., second) variable and are such that the function and the derivatives
extend continuously to [0, T ] × [0, L]. For φ ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × [0, L]), Dtφ,Dφ,D2φ will denote
the time derivative and the first two space derivatives of φ, respectively. For x ∈ S, δx ∈ P(S)
denotes the Dirac measure at x.
2 The n-server queuing control problem
We consider a symmetric n-server stochastic queueing system. Each server i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is
associated with a queue with a finite capacity and is able to control the rates of the service
and arrivals of jobs to its queue. The rates can also depend on the state of the queue and
on the empirical measure of the states of all the n-queues. We will consider a regime where
the arrival and processing rates are approximately the same and are of the same order as the
number of queues in the system. We now describe our precise scaling regime and introduce
the various processes that determine the evolution of the state of the system.
2.1 Diffusion scaling
Fix T,L > 0 and n ∈ N. Here T denotes the terminal time of our finite time horizon and [0, L]
will be the state space of the scaled queue length process. Let U be a compact subset of R.
We will denote by λn,i and µn,i the (controlled) arrival and service rates associated with queue
i. Fix an arbitrary sequence of scaling parameters {en}n that satisfy en → ∞ when n → ∞.
The rates will be O(√en) perturbations of certain nominal (uncontrolled) O(en) overall rates.
More precisely, we assume that there exist λˆ, µˆ > 0, and bounded and measurable functions
λ, µ : [0, T ]× P([0, L]) × [0, L]× U → R such that
λn,i(t) = λˆen + λ(t, ν˜
n(t), Q˜n,i(t), αn,i(t))
√
en + o(
√
en),
µn,i(t) = µˆen + µ(t, ν˜
n(t), Q˜n,i(t), αn,i(t))
√
en + o(
√
en), (2.1)
5
where Q˜n,i(t) = 1√enQ
n,i(t), Qn,i(t) is the size of the i-th queue at time t,
ν˜n(t)
.
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δQ˜n,i(t)
is the empirical distribution of the scaled queue lengths in the n-th system at time t, and αn,i(t)
is the control that server i exercises at time t. The term o(
√
en) represents an expression of the
form rn(t, ν˜
n(t), Q˜n,i(t), αn,i(t)) where rn : [0, T ] × P([0, L]) × [0, L] × U → R are measurable
functions such that rn/
√
en converges uniformly to 0 as n → ∞. Additional conditions on λ
and µ will be introduced in later sections. Each server in the n-th system has a finite buffer
of size Ln =
√
enL and arriving jobs to a full buffer are lost. We assume that the system is in
heavy traffic, namely
λˆ = µˆ.
We now give a precise description of controlled stochastic processes of interest. For each
fixed n, let (Ω′,F ′,P′) be a probability space on which are given unit rate independent Poisson
processes Nn,i and Mn,i, i = 1, . . . , n. Roughly speaking, Nn,i will correspond to the stream
of jobs entering the i-the queue and Mn,i to the jobs that leave the system after service. The
evolution of the i-th controlled queue is given as follows.
Qn,i(t) = Qn,i(0) +An,i(t)−Dn,i(t), i = 1, . . . , n, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.2)
where Qn,i(0) ≥ 0 is the initial size of the i-th queue,
An,i(t) = Nn,i
(∫ t
0
1{Qn,i(s)<L}λ
n,i(s)ds
)
, Dn,i(t) =Mn,i
(∫ t
0
1{Qn,i(s)>0}µ
n,i(s)ds
)
(2.3)
are the arrival and departure processes respectively, where λn,i and µn,i are defined as in
(2.1) in terms of control processes {αn,i}. We will assume that {Qn,i(0)}ni=1 are exchangeable
for all n. We require that the control processes are suitably non-anticipative. Specifically, we
assume that for some filtration {Ft} on (Ω′,F ′,P′), αn,i is {Ft}-progressively measurable, Qn,i,
n ≥ i ≥ 1 are {Ft}-adapted, and
A˜n,i(t)
.
=
An,i(t)− ∫ t0 1{Qn,i(s)<L}λn,i(s)ds√
en
, D˜n,i(t)
.
=
Dn,i(t)− ∫ t0 1{Qn,i(s)>0}µn,i(s)ds√
en
are {Ft} martingales with quadratic variations
〈A˜n,i, A˜n,j〉(t) = δij 1
en
∫ t
0
1{Qn,i(s)<L}λ
n,i(s)ds, 〈D˜n,i, D˜n,j〉(t) = δij 1
en
∫ t
0
1{Qn,i(s)>0}µ
n,i(s)ds,
(2.4)
and 〈A˜n,i, D˜n,j〉(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], i, j = 1, . . . , n where δij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. The
process αn = {αn,i}ni=1 will be referred to as an admissible control and we denote the collection
of all such controls by Un. With an abuse of terminology, for αn = {αn,i}ni=1 as above, we will
refer to αn,i as an admissible control for the i-th player.
From (2.2) we have the following evolution equation for the scaled queue length processes.
For t ∈ [0, T ]
Q˜n,i(t) = Q˜n,i(0) + A˜n,i(t)− D˜n,i(t) +
∫ t
0
b˜n,i(s)ds + Y˜ n,i(t)− R˜n,i(t) + o(1), (2.5)
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where
Y˜ n,i(t)
.
=
∫ t
0 1{Q˜n,i(s)=0}µ
n,i(s)ds
√
en
, R˜n,i(t)
.
=
∫ t
0 1{Q˜n,i(s)=L}λ
n,i(s)ds
√
en
, (2.6)
b˜n,i(t)
.
= b(t, ν˜n(t), Q˜n,i(t), αn,i(t)), b
.
= λ− µ,
and o(1) represents a stochastic process ηn,i satisfying for each i sup0≤t≤T |ηn,i(t)| → 0, in
probability, as n → ∞. The above dynamics can equivalently be described in terms of a
Skorohod map as we do below. Let D0[0, T ] be the subset of D([0, T ] : R) consisting of all ψ
such that ψ(0) ∈ [0, L].
Definition 2.1 Given ψ ∈ D0[0, T ] we say the triplet of functions (ϕ, ζ1, ζ2) ∈ D([0, T ] : R3)
solves the Skorohod problem for ψ if the following properties are satisfied:
(i) For every t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ(t) = ψ(t) + ζ1(t)− ζ2(t) ∈ [0, L].
(ii) ζi are nonnegative and nondecreasing, ζ1(0) = ζ2(0) = 0, and∫
[0,T ]
1(0,L](ϕ(s))dζ1(s) =
∫
[0,T ]
1[0,L)(ϕ(s))dζ2(s) = 0.
We denote by Γ(ψ) = (Γ1,Γ2,Γ3)(ψ) = (ϕ, ζ1, ζ2) and refer to Γ as the Skorohod map.
It is known that there is a unique solution to the Skorohod problem for every ψ ∈ D0[0, T ] and
so the Skorohod map in Definition 2.1 is well defined. The Skorohod map has the following
Lipschitz property (see [51]).
Lemma 2.1 There exists cS ∈ (0,∞) such that for all ω, ω˜ ∈ D0([0, T ]),
3∑
i=1
‖Γi(ω)− Γi(ω˜)‖T ≤ cS‖ω − ω˜‖T .
The dynamics in (2.5) can be described in terms of the Skorohod map as follows
(Q˜n,i, Y˜ n,i, R˜n,i)(t) = Γ
(
Q˜n,i(0) +
∫ ·
0
b˜n,i(s)ds + A˜n,i(·) − D˜n,i(·) + o(1)
)
(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.7)
2.2 The control problem
We now introduce the cost function and the control problem studied in this work. The total
expected cost for server i associated with the initial condition
Q˜n(0) = (Q˜n,1(0), . . . , Q˜n,n(0)) and control αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Un is given by
Jn,i(Q˜n(0);αn)
.
= E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t, ν˜n(t), Q˜n,i(t), αn,i(t))dt+ g(ν˜n(T ), Q˜n,i(T )) (2.8)
+
∫ T
0
y(t, ν˜n(t))dY˜ n,i(t) +
∫ T
0
r(t, ν˜n(t))dR˜n,i(t)
]
,
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where f : [0, T ] × P([0, L]) × [0, L] × U → R is the running cost, g : P(R) × [0, L] → R is
the terminal cost, and r, y : [0, T ] × P([0, L]) → R+ are the costs associated with rejection
of jobs and empty buffers, respectively. Here f, g, y, and r are bounded measurable functions
that will be required to satisfy additional conditions that will be introduced in Section 3 (see
Assumption 3.1). Each player (server) seeks to minimize its cost. A natural formulation of
optimality for such n-player games is given in terms of a (near) Nash equilibrium. Computing
near Nash equilibria for such complex and large multi-player games is in general intractable
and thus we instead consider an asymptotic formulation of the problem.
Definition 2.2 A sequence of admissible controls {α˜n,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}n∈N is called an asymptotic
Nash equilibrium if for every player j, and every sequence of admissible controls {βn}∞n=1 for
that player, one has
lim sup
n→∞
Jn,j(Q˜n(0); α˜n,1, . . . , α˜n,n) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ J
n,j(Q˜n(0); α˜n,1, . . . , α˜n,j−1, βn, α˜n,j+1, . . . , α˜n,n).
Objective of this work is to show that, under conditions, an asymptotic Nash equilibrium exists
which can be approximated by analyzing a related MFG. The main results are Theorem 3.1
(solvability of MFG) and Theorem 4.1 (asymptotic optimality).
3 The MFG
A natural approach for constructing asymptotic near Nash equilibria for the above n-player
game has emerged from the works of [24, 27, 28]. Starting point in this approach is to consider
an MFG that formally corresponds to the limit of the above n-player games as n → ∞. In
this section we give a precise description of this MFG in the current context and give our main
results on existence and uniqueness of solutions.
3.1 Description of the MFG
The basic idea in the formulation of the MFG is to approximate the scaled queue length
process for a typical queue by a suitable drift-controlled reflected Brownian motion. We next
introduce this controlled process. Let (Ω,F , {Ft},P) be a filtered probability space on which
is given a one dimensional standard Ft-Brownian motion B. We will refer to the collection
(Ω,F , {Ft},P, B) as a system and denote it by Ξ. Given x ∈ [0, L], t ∈ [0, T ], and ν ∈ PT,L,
we denote by A(Ξ, t, x, ν) the collection of all pairs (α,Z) where α = {α(s)}0≤s≤T−t is a U -
valued Fs-progressively measurable process, Z = {Z(s)}0≤s≤T−t is a [0, L] × R+ × R+ valued
Fs-adapted continuous process such that, Z = (X,Y,R) and
Z(s) = (X,Y,R)(s) = Γ
(
x+
∫ ·
0
b¯(u)du+ σB(·)
)
(s), s ∈ [0, T − t], (3.1)
where
b¯(u)
.
= b(t+ u, ν(t+ u),X(u), α(u)), u ∈ [0, T − t],
ν(s) is the marginal of ν at time instant s and σ =
√
2λˆ. We now introduce the cost function
in the MFG. Given ν ∈ PT,L, x ∈ [0, L], t ∈ [0, T ], and a system Ξ as above, let (α,Z) ∈
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A(Ξ, t, x, ν). Define
Jν(t, x, α, Z)
.
= E
[ ∫ T−t
0
f(s+ t, ν(s+ t),X(s), α(s))ds + g(ν(T ),X(T − t))
+
∫ T−t
0
y(s+ t, ν(s+ t))dY (s) +
∫ T−t
0
r(s+ t, ν(s+ t))dR(s)
]
. (3.2)
We define the value function associated with the above cost as:
Vν(t, x) = inf
Ξ
inf
(α,Z)∈A(Ξ,t,x,ν)
Jν(t, x, α, Z). (3.3)
Definition 3.1 A solution to the MFG with initial condition x ∈ [0, L] is defined to be a
ν ∈ PT,L such that there exist a system Ξ and an (α,Z) ∈ A(Ξ, 0, x, ν) such that Z = (X,Y,R)
satisfies P ◦X−1 = ν and
Vν(0, x) = Jν(0, x, α, Z). (3.4)
If there exists a unique such ν, we refer to Vν(0, x) as the value of the MFG with initial
condition x.
To find a solution of the MFG one usually follows the following iterative procedure:
(i) For a fixed ν ∈ PT,L solve the stochastic control problem (3.3)(with t = 0), namely find
a system Ξ and (α,Z) ∈ A(Ξ, 0, x, ν) such that (3.4) holds. Denote by ν¯ the law of X
where Z = (X,Y,R) and write ν¯ = Φ(ν) (this is not precise since in general there may
be more than one solution of the stochastic control problem in (3.3)).
(ii) Find the fixed point of the map Φ, namely a ν¯ ∈ PT,L for which ν¯ = Φ(ν¯). Note that by
definition, such a ν¯ will be a solution of the MFG.
We now analyze the MFG by following the above steps. The main result is Theorem 3.1
which gives existence of solutions of the MFG under suitable conditions and proves uniqueness
of solutions under stronger conditions.
3.2 Solving the stochastic control problem (3.3)
For c ∈ (0,∞), let Mc be the collection of all ν ∈ PT,L such that
sup
0≤s<t≤T
W1(ν(t), ν(s))
(t− s)1/2 ≤ c
and let
M0 = ∪c>0Mc.
Fix a measure ν ∈ M0. For ν ∈ PT,L, the function t 7→ ν(t) is a continuous function from [0, T ]
to P([0, L]) and with an abuse of notation we denote this continuous function once more as ν.
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As one might expect, the value function Vν(t, x) corresponds to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation:
−Dtφ−H(t, ν(t), x,Dφ) − 1
2
σ2D2φ = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, L], (3.5)
with the boundary conditions (BC)
φ(T, x) = g(ν(T ), x), Dφ(t, 0) = −y(t, ν(t)), and Dφ(t, L) = r(t, ν(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], (3.6)
where H is the Hamiltonian given as
H(t, η, x, p) = inf
u∈U
h(t, η, x, u, p)
and h : [0, T ]× P([0, L]) × [0, L]× U × R→ R is defined as
h(t, η, x, u, p) = f(t, η, x, u) + b(t, η, x, u)p. (3.7)
We now introduce a key condition under which the above HJB equation characterizes the value
function Vν(t, x).
Assumption 3.1
(a) There exists cL ∈ (0,∞) such that for every t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], η, η′ ∈ P([0, L]), x, x′ ∈ [0, L],
and α,α′ ∈ U ,
|f(t, η, x, α) − f(t′, η′, x′, α′)|+ |g(η, x) − g(η′, x′)|+ |b(t, η, x, α) − b(t′, η′, x′, α′)|
+ |y(t, η) − y(t′, η′)|+ |r(t, η)− r(t′, η′)|
≤ cL(|t− t′|+W1(η, η′) + |x− x′|+ |α− α′|). (3.8)
(b) For every (t, η, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × P([0, L]) × [0, L] × R, there is a unique αˆ(t, η, x, p) ∈ U
such that
αˆ(t, η, x, p) = argmin
u∈U
h(t, η, x, u, p). (3.9)
From Berge’s maximum theorem (see [4, Theorem 17.31]) and part (b) of the above assumption
it follows that αˆ is a continuous function on [0, T ]×P([0, L])× [0, L]×R. Also note that (3.8)
implies that b, f, g, y, r are bounded functions, in particular,
sup
(η,x,u)∈[0,T ]×P([0,L])×[0,L]×U
|b(t, η, x, u)| .= cB <∞. (3.10)
The first part of the condition implies Ho¨lder-1/2 continuity in t when η is replaced by ν(t)
for some ν ∈ M0. For example, if ν ∈ Mc, for t, t′ ∈ [0, T ]
|y(t, ν(t)) − y(t′, ν(t′))| ≤ cL(c+
√
T )|t− t′|1/2. (3.11)
Similar estimates hold for b, f, r and g.
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Assumption 3.1 will guarantee that the value function is the unique classical solution of
the HJB equation (3.5) with BC (3.6) (see Proposition 3.1). The assumption will also be used
in the fixed point argument (Section 3.3) and in the asymptotic analysis of the n-player game
(Section 4). Using Girsanov’s theorem it is easily checked that given a measurable function
γ : [0, T ]× [0, L]→ U , ν ∈ PT,L, and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, L] there is a unique weak solution Z to
Z(s) = (X,Y,R)(s) = Γ
(
x+
∫ ·
0
b(t+ t′, ν(t+ t′),X(t′), γ(t′,X(t′)))dt′ + σB(·)
)
(s), (3.12)
s ∈ [0, T − t], namely there is a system Ξ = (Ω,F , {Ft},P, B) on which is given a Fs-adapted
continuous process Z = (X,Y,R) solving the above equation and if Ξ′ = (Ω′,F ′, {F ′t},P′, B′)
is another system on which is given a F ′s-adapted continuous process Z ′ = (X ′, Y ′, R′) solving
the above equation with (Z,X,B) replaced by (Z ′,X ′, B′) then P◦Z−1 = P′◦(Z ′)−1. Note also
that with α(s) = γ(s,X(s)), (α,Z) ∈ A(Ξ, t, x, ν). We refer to the function γ as a feedback
control and we call it an optimal feedback control for the stochastic control problem in (3.3) if
Vν(t, x) = Jν(t, x, α, Z).
The following result which is a consequence of Theorem 13.24 of [62] says that the HJB equa-
tion (3.5) with BC (3.6) admits a unique classical solution which can be characterized as the
value function Vν . Moreover, there exists an optimal feedback control with certain regularity
properties. We follow the notation from [62]. Let for δ ∈ (0, 1], Hδ be the collection of maps
ψ : (0, T ) × (0, L)→ R such that
sup
0<t<t′<T,0<x<x′<L
|ψ(t, x) − ψ(t′, x′)|
|t− t′|δ/2 + |x− x′|δ <∞.
Note that such a function can be continuously extended to [0, T ] × [0, L] and we denote the
extension by the same symbol. Also, let H2+ 1
2
be the collection of continuous real functions
ψ on [0, T ] × [0, L] such that x 7→ ψ(t, x) is twice continuously differentiable on (0, L) for all
t ∈ (0, T ), t 7→ ψ(t, x) is continuously differentiable on (0, T ) for all x ∈ (0, L), the functions
ψ, Dtψ, Dψ D
2ψ,
are bounded on (0, T ) × (0, L) and the functions Dtψ, D2ψ are in H1/2.
Proposition 3.1 Fix ν ∈ M0 and suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then Vν ∈ H2+ 1
2
and
it is the unique solution of (3.5)–(3.6). Furthermore, with αˆ as introduced in Assumption 3.1,
the map (s, x′) 7→ αˆ(s, ν(s), x′,DVν(s, x′)) is continuous and the feedback control γˆ(u, x′) .=
αˆ(u+ t, ν(u+ t), x′,DVν(u+ t, x′)) is an optimal feedback control for (3.3) for every t ∈ (0, T ).
Moreover, any optimal control α for (3.3) satisfies α(u, ω) = γˆ(u,X(u, ω)), λtT ⊗ P almost
surely (a.s.), where λtT denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, T − t].
Proof: From [62, Theorem 13.24] and the paragraph following its statement it follows that
(3.5)–(3.6) admits a solution in H
2+
1
2
. We remark that the key conditions needed to appeal
to this theorem are that
sup
0<t<t′<T
|y(t, ν(t))− y(t′, ν(t′))|+ |r(t, ν(t))− r(t′, ν(t′))|
|t− t′|1/2 <∞,
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and for each M ∈ (0,∞)
sup
t,t′∈[0,T ], x,x′∈[0,L], p,p′∈[−M,M ],
t6=t′,x 6=x′,p 6=p′
|H(t, ν(t), x, p) −H(t′, ν(t′), x′, p′)|
|t− t′|1/2 + |x− x′|+ |p− p′| <∞.
Both these conditions are easily seen to hold on using Assumption 3.1 and the property that
ν ∈ Mc for some c <∞ (see e.g. (3.11)).
We now argue uniqueness and characterize the solution as the value function Vν in (3.3).
Let ψ ∈ H2+ 1
2
be a solution of (3.5)–(3.6). Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, L], a system Ξ and (α,Z) ∈
A(Ξ, t, x, ν). By an application of Itoˆ’s lemma and using (3.5)–(3.6) we get
E[g(ν(T ),X(T − t))] = E[ψ(T,X(T − t))]
= ψ(t, x) + E
[∫ T−t
0
Dψ(s+ t, 0)dY (s)−
∫ T−t
0
Dψ(s + t, L)dR(s)
]
+ E
∫ T−t
0
[
Dsψ(s + t,X(s)) + b(s+ t, ν(s+ t),X(s), α(s))Dψ(s + t,X(s))
+
1
2
σ2D2ψ(s + t,X(s))
]
ds
≥ ψ(t, x) + E
[
−
∫ T−t
0
f(s+ t, ν(s+ t),X(s), α(s))ds
−
∫ T−t
0
y(s+ t, ν(s+ t))dY (s)−
∫ T−t
0
r(s+ t, ν(s+ t))dR(s)
]
.
(3.13)
Hence, with Z = (X,Y,R),
Jν(t, x, α, Z) = E
[∫ T−t
0
f(s+ t, ν(s+ t),X(s), α(s))ds + g(ν(T ),X(T − t)) (3.14)
+
∫ T−t
0
y(s+ t, ν(s+ t))dY (s) +
∫ T−t
0
r(s+ t, ν(s+ t))dR(s)
]
≥ ψ(t, x).
Since Ξ, α, Z are arbitrary, we get that Vν(t, x) ≥ ψ(t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, L]. Let
γˆ be as in the statement of the proposition with Vν replaced by ψ. Let Z = (X,Y,R) be a
solution of (3.12) with γ replaced by γˆ given on some system Ξ. Then a similar calculation
using Itoˆ’s formula but with α(u) = γˆ(u,X(u)) shows that Jν(t, x, α, Z) = ψ(t, x) for all
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, L]. This shows that ψ = Vν and so Vν is the unique H2+ 1
2
solution of
(3.5)–(3.6). Also, we have that γˆ as in the statement of the lemma is an optimal feedback
control.
Since Vν ∈ H2+ 1
2
, the continuity of the map (t, x) 7→ αˆ(t, ν(t), x,DVν(t, x)) is immediate
from the continuity of the map αˆ that was noted below Assumption 3.1.
We now show that γˆ is the unique optimal control for (3.3). Fix an optimal control
(α,Z) ∈ A(Ξ, t, x, ν) given on some system Ξ. We claim that α(u, ω) = γˆ(u,X(u, ω)), λtT × P-
a.s. Indeed, suppose that there is a set with a positive λtT × P-measure on which the equality
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fails. Then by Assumption 3.1.(b) together with (3.5)–(3.6), it follows that (3.13) holds with
a strict inequality, which in turn implies that (3.14) holds with a strict inequality. Recalling
that Vν = ψ, we arrive at a contradiction. ✷
3.3 Solving the MFG
We now turn to step (ii) in solving the fixed point problem. Although for existence of a
fixed point Assumption 3.1 will suffice, in order to get uniqueness, we will need the following
additional assumption. Similar assumption has been used to argue uniqueness of fixed points
in previous works on MFG (see e.g. [60, Theorem 2.4], [24, Section 3], [38, equation (17)], [28,
Assumption (U)]). Fix η0 ∈ P([0, L]).
Assumption 3.2 For every (t, η, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]× P([0, L]) × [0, L] × U ,
b(t, η, x, u) = b(t, η0, x, u), f(t, η, x, u) = f0(t, η, x) + f1(t, x, u), (3.15)
y(t, η) = y(t, η0), r(t, η) = r(t, η0). (3.16)
Moreover, for every t ∈ [0, T ] and η, η′ ∈ P([0, L]), f0 and g satisfy the following monotonicity
property ∫ L
0
[f0(t, η, x) − f0(t, η′, x))]d(η − η′)(x) ≥ 0,∫ L
0
(g(η, x) − g(η′, x))d(η − η′)(x) ≥ 0.
Abusing notation, when Assumption 3.2 holds, we will write b(t, x, u) = b(t, η0, x, u), y(t) =
y(t, η0), and r(t) = r(t, η0).
Remark 3.1 Examples satisfying Assumption 3.2 are given in [24, page 8] and [13, page 6].
Another natural example that satisfies this assumption is a cost function that is linear in the
mean-field term. That is,
f0(t, η, x) = a1(t)(c1 + ψ1(x))
∫ L
0
ψ1(y)dη(y), g(η, x) = (c2 + ψ2(x))
∫ L
0
ψ2(y)dη(y),
where a1 : [0, T ] → R+, ψ1, ψ2 : [0, L] → R, and c1, c2 ∈ R. From a modeling perspective,
by choosing positive and nondecreasing ψi’s and a positive a1, the system planner penalizes
all servers collectively when the empirical measure has high ψi-moments and in addition it
penalizes individual servers for long queues.
Theorem 3.1 Under Assumption 3.1, there exists a solution of the MFG. If in addition As-
sumption 3.2 holds then there is a unique MFG solution.
The proof will appeal to Schauder’s fixed point theorem. Since Schauder’s original work
(cf. [64]), there have been several versions of this result. We now quote the version ([65,
Theorem 4.1.1]) that will be used here.
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Lemma 3.1 LetM be a non-empty convex subset of a normed space B. Let Φ be a continuous
mapping ofM into a compact set K ⊂M. Then Φ has a fixed point, namely there exists x ∈ K
such that Φ(x) = x.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We will apply Lemma 3.1 to the space B of finite signed measures
on C([0, T ] : [0, L]) which is equipped with the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm
‖ν‖KR = sup
{∣∣∣∣∣
∫
C([0,T ]:[0,L])
F (ω)dν(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣ : F ∈ Lip1(C([0, T ] : [0, L]))
}
, ν ∈ B.
The distance driven by the norm, restricted to PT,L, coincides with the Wasserstein’s distance
of order 1 (see [68, Remark 6.5]), which due to compactness of [0, L] generates the same
topology on PT,L as that for weak convergence.
We now introduce a mapping Φ on the non-empty and convex set M0 that satisfies the
conditions stated in Lemma 3.1.
Definition of Φ. For ν ∈ M0, let αν denote the optimal feedback control γˆ for (3.3) (with
t = 0) given through Proposition 3.1. Let Zν = (Xν , Y ν , Rν) denote the unique weak solution
of (3.12) with γ replaced with αν given on some system Ξ = (Ω,F , {Ft},P, B). Define Φ(ν) =
P ◦ (Xν)−1.
Invariance of M0. For ν ∈ M0 and 0 ≤ s ≤ t < T
W1(Φ(ν)(t),Φ(ν)(s)) ≤ E|Xν(t)−Xν(s)| (3.17)
≤ cS max{cB , σ}
(
(t− s) + E sup
s≤u≤t
|B(u)−B(s)|
)
≤ 4Cˆ(t− s)1/2,
where Cˆ
.
= cS max{cB , σ}, and the last inequality uses Doob’s maximal inequality. This shows
that Φ(ν) ∈ M0 for all ν ∈ M0.
We now show that Φ(M0) is contained in a compact set in PT,L, i.e. Φ(M0) is relatively
compact.
Relative compactness of Φ(M0). For f ∈ C([0, T ] : R) and δ > 0, let
̟f (δ) = sup
s,t∈[0,T ]:|t−s|≤δ
|f(t)− f(s)|.
Then for ε, δ, ̺ > 0 and ν ∈ M0, similar to the estimate in (3.17),
Φ(ν)(Xν : ̟Xν (δ) ≥ ̺) ≤ 1
̺
E sup
0≤s≤t≤s+δ≤T
|Xν(t)−Xν(s)|
≤ Cˆ
̺
(
δ + E sup
0≤s≤t≤s+δ≤T
sup
s≤u≤t
|B(u)−B(s)|
)
≤ Cˆ
̺
(δ + E̟B(δ)).
Since E̟B(δ)→ 0 as δ → 0, we have from [16, Theorem 7.3] that {Φ(ν) : ν ∈ M0} is relatively
compact in PT,L.
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Continuity of Φ. We now argue that Φ is a continuous map on M0. Consider a system
Ξ = (Ω,F , {Ft},P, B) and let Z0 = (X0, Y 0, R0) be given as
Z0(s) = (X0(s), Y 0(s), R0(s)) = Γ(x+ σB(·))(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T. (3.18)
Define for ν ′ ∈ M0
α0ν′(t) = αˆ(t, ν
′(t),X0(t),DVν′(t,X0(t))), t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.19)
Let νn, ν ∈ M0 be such that νn → ν. Since sup0≤t≤T W1(νn(t), ν(t)) ≤ W1(νn, ν), the above
convergence implies that
lim
n→∞ sup0≤t≤T
W1(ν
n(t), ν(t)) = 0. (3.20)
We now show that α0νn → α0ν in λT × P-measure. Recall that αˆ is a continuous map. Hence,
in view of (3.20), for the desired convergence, it is sufficient to show that
lim
n→∞E
[∫ T
0
|DVνn(t,X0(t))−DVν(t,X0(t))|dt
]
= 0. (3.21)
The proof is a modification of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [45]. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to
Vν′(t,X
0(t)) for fixed ν ′ ∈ M0 and using from Proposition 3.1 the fact that Vν′ solves (3.5)–
(3.6), we have for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Vν′(t,X
0(t))− Vν′(T,X0(T )) (3.22)
=
∫ T
t
H(s, ν ′(s),X0(s),DVν′(s,X0(s)))ds − σ
∫ T
t
DVν′(s,X
0(s))dB(s)
+
∫ T
t
y(s, ν ′(s))dY 0(s) +
∫ T
t
r(s, ν ′(s))dR0(s).
Let,
∆V n(t) = Vνn(t,X
0(t))− Vν(t,X0(t)), ∆DV n(t) = DVνn(t,X0(t))−DVν(t,X0(t))
∆gn(T ) = ∆V n(T ) = g(νn(T ),X0(T ))− g(ν(T ),X0(T )),
∆yn(t) = y(t, νn(t))− y(t, ν(t)), ∆rn(t) = r(t, νn(t)) − r(t, ν(t)),
∆ψn(t) = sup
α∈U
|ψ(t, νn(t),X0(t), α) − ψ(t, ν(t),X0(t), α)|, ψ ∈ {f, b}. (3.23)
Then, (3.22) and (3.23) imply,
∆V n(t) + σ
∫ T
t
∆DV n(s)dB(s)
= ∆gn(T ) +
∫ T
t
∆yn(s)dY 0(s) +
∫ T
t
∆rn(s)dR0(s)
+
∫ T
t
[H(s, νn(s),X0(s),DVνn(s,X
0(s)))−H(s, νn(s),X0(s),DVν(s,X0(s)))]ds
+
∫ T
t
[H(s, νn(s),X0(s),DVν(s,X
0(s)))−H(s, ν(s),X0(s),DVν(s,X0(s)))]ds.
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Squaring both sides and then taking expectations gives
E[(∆V n(t))2] + σ2E
[∫ T
t
(∆DV n(s))2ds
]
(3.24)
≤ 2(T − t)E
[ ∫ T
t
[H(s, νn(s),X0(s),DVνn(s,X
0(s)))−H(s, νn(s),X0(s),DVν(s,X0(s)))]2ds
]
+ 2Cn(t)
≤ 2c2B(T − t)E
[ ∫ T
t
(∆DV n(s))2ds
]
+ 2Cn(t),
where
Cn(t) = E
[
∆gn(T ) +
∫ T
t
∆yn(s)dY 0(s) +
∫ T
t
∆rn(s)dR0(s)
+
∫ T
t
[H(s, νn(s),X0(s),DVν(s,X
0(s)))−H(s, ν(s),X0(s),DVν(s,X0(s)))]ds
]2
.
Letting δ = σ2/(4c2B), we get from (3.24) that for every t ∈ [T − δ, T ],
E[(∆V n(t))2] +
σ2
2
E
[∫ T
t
(∆DV n(s))2ds
]
≤ 4Cn(t). (3.25)
We now show that lim supn→∞ sup0≤t≤T Cn(t) = 0. Note that there exists C1 ∈ (0,∞) such
that the following inequality holds for all n ∈ N.
1
C1
sup
0≤t≤T
Cn(t) ≤ E [(∆gn(T ))2]+ E [(Y 0(T ))2] sup
0≤t≤T
(∆yn(t))2 + E
[
(R0(T ))2
]
sup
0≤t≤T
(∆rn(t))2
+ E
[∫ T
0
(∆fn(s))2ds
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
(∆bn(s))2ds
∫ T
0
(DVν(s,X
0(s)))2ds
]
.
(3.26)
Using the properties of the Skorohod map (Lemma 2.1) it follows that
E
[
(Y 0(T ))2 + (R0(T ))2
]
<∞.
The convergence of the right side of (3.26) to 0 is now immediate from Assumption 3.1(a), the
boundedness of DVν , and (3.20). Thus from (3.25) we have that
lim
n→∞E
[∫ T
T−δ
|DVνn(t,X0(t))−DVν(t,X0(t))|dt
]
= 0, lim
n→∞E[(∆V
n(T − δ))2] = 0. (3.27)
Using the second convergence in (3.27) and repeating the above argument for t ∈ [T − δ, T ] to
the interval [T − 2δ, T − δ], we see that (3.27) holds with T replaced with T − δ. Proceeding
recursively in this manner we have (3.21). Hence we have shown that
α0νn → α0ν in λT × P - measure. (3.28)
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Using the above property we will now argue that Φ(νn) → Φ(ν) as n → ∞, completing the
proof of continuity of Φ. Let for ν ′ ∈M0,
γν′(t, x) = αˆ(t, ν
′(t), x,DVν′(t, x)), bˆν′(t, x) = b(t, ν ′(t), x, γν′(t, x)), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, L]
and let Pν
′
be a probability measure on (Ω,F) defined as
dPν
′
= exp
[
1
σ
∫ T
0
bˆν′(t,X
0(t))dB(t) − 1
2σ2
∫ T
0
bˆ2ν′(t,X
0(t))dt
]
dP. (3.29)
By Girsanov’s theorem Pν
′ ◦ (X0)−1 = Φ(ν ′). Thus to show Φ(νn)→ Φ(ν) it suffices to argue
that Pν
n → Pν. We will in fact show that R(Pν‖Pνn)→ 0 as n→∞, where
R(Pν‖Pνn) = Eν
(
log
dPν
dPνn
)
= E
(
dPν
dP
log
dPν
dPνn
)
is the relative entropy of Pν with respect to Pν
n
, which due to Pinsker’s inequality (see [67,
Page 132]) gives the convergence of Pν
n
to Pν .
Let
∆bˆn(t, x) = bˆν(t, x)− bˆνn(t, x), ∆bˆ2n(t, x) = bˆ2ν(t, x)− bˆ2νn(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, L].
With this notation,
log
dPν
dPνn
=
1
σ
∫ T
0
∆bˆn(t,X
0(t))dB(t) − 1
2σ2
∫ T
0
∆bˆ2n(t,X
0(t))dt.
Also, noting that since b is bounded E(dP
ν
dP )
2 .= κ <∞, we have from Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity
R(Pν‖Pνn) ≤ √κ
(
E
[
1
σ
∫ T
0
∆bˆn(t,X
0(t))dB(t)− 1
2σ2
∫ T
0
∆bˆ2n(t,X
0(t))dt
]2)1/2
. (3.30)
Next note that
E
[
1
σ
∫ T
0
∆bˆn(t,X
0(t))dB(t)
]2
=
1
σ2
∫ T
0
E[∆bˆn(t,X
0(t))]2dt
=
1
σ2
∫ T
0
E
[
b(t, ν(t),X0(t), α0ν(t,X
0(t)))− b(t, νn(t),X0(t), α0νn(t,X0(t)))
]2
dt.
The last term converges to 0 from the boundedness and continuity of b, (3.20) and (3.28).
Similarly
E
[
1
2σ2
∫ T
0
∆bˆ2n(t,X
0(t))dt
]2
→ 0
as n → ∞. Using the above two observations in (3.30) we have R(Pν‖Pνn) → 0 and thus,
as argued earlier, the proof of continuity of Φ is complete. Thus we have shown that Φ is a
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continuous map on M0, which is a non-empty convex subset of the normed space B, into a
compact set K ⊂M0. Thus by the fixed point theorem in Lemma 3.1, Φ has a fixed point.
The first results on unique solvability of a MFG go back to [60]. Since then uniqueness has
been argued in various settings (see e.g. [24, 38, 28]). The proof given below uses arguments
similar to those in [28, Section 7.3], however for the sake of completeness we give the details.
Consider as before a system Ξ = (Ω,F , {Ft},P, B) and let Z0 = (X0, Y 0, R0) be given through
(3.18). Let ν1, ν2 ∈ M0. For i = 1, 2, let α0νi and Pνi be given by (3.19) and (3.29), respectively,
with νi replacing ν
′. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to Vν1(t,X0(t)) and recalling that Vν1 solves (3.5)–
(3.6) with ν replaced with ν1, we get
Vν1(T,X
0(T ))− Vν1(0, x)
= −
∫ T
0
H(t, ν1(t),X
0(t),DVν1(t,X
0(t)))dt+ σ
∫ T
0
DVν1(t,X
0(t))dB(t) + ζT
= −
∫ T
0
h(t, ν1(t),X
0(t), α0ν1(t),DVν1(t,X
0(t)))dt+ σ
∫ T
0
DVν1(t,X
0(t))dB(t) + ζT ,
where recalling the form of y and r from Assumption 3.2
ζT =
∫
[0,T ]
DVν1(t, 0)dY
0(t) +
∫
[0,T ]
DVν1(t, L)dR
0(t)
=
∫
[0,T ]
y(t)dY 0(t) +
∫
[0,T ]
r(t)dR0(t).
Observing that for t ∈ [0, T ]
h(t, ν1(t),X
0(t), α0ν1(t),DVν1(t,X
0(t))) = h(t, ν1(t),X
0(t), α0ν1(t),DVν2(t,X
0(t))) +Rt,
where
Rt = [DVν1(t,X0(t))−DVν2(t,X0(t))]bˆν1(t,X0(t)),
we have
Vν1(0, x) = g(ν1(T ),X
0(T )) +
∫ T
0
h(t, ν1(t),X
0(t), α0ν1(t),DVν2(t,X
0(t)))dt (3.31)
+
∫ T
0
Rtdt− σ
∫ T
0
DVν1(t,X
0(t))dB(t)− ζT .
Similarly, applying Itoˆ’s lemma to Vν2(t,X
0(t))
Vν2(0, x) = g(ν2(T ),X
0(T )) +
∫ T
0
H(t, ν2(t),X
0(t),DVν2(t,X
0(t)))dt (3.32)
− σ
∫ T
0
DVν2(t,X
0(t))dB(t) − ζT .
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Substracting (3.32) from (3.31)
Vν1(0, x) − Vν2(0, x)
= g(ν1(T ),X
0(T ))− g(ν2(T ),X0(T ))− σ
∫ T
0
[DVν1(t,X
0(t))−DVν2(t,X0(t))]dBν1(t)
+
∫ T
0
[
h(t, ν1(t),X
0(t), α0ν1(t),DVν2(t,X
0(t)))−H(t, ν2(t),X0(t),DVν2(t,X0(t)))
]
dt,
where for i = 1, 2, Bνi(t)
.
= B(t) − 1σ
∫ t
0 bˆνi(s,X
0(s))ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. Since under Pνi , Bνi is a
standard Brownian motion, taking expectation under the measure Pν1
Vν1(0, x)− Vν2(0, x)
= Eν1
[ ∫ T
0
[
h(t, ν1(t),X
0(t), α0ν1(t),DVν2(t,X
0(t)))−H(t, ν2(t),X0(t),DVν2(t,X0(t)))
]
dt
+ g(ν1(T ),X
0(T ))− g(ν2(T ),X0(T ))
]
. (3.33)
A similar calculation shows
Vν1(0, x)− Vν2(0, x)
= Eν2
[ ∫ T
0
[
H(t, ν1(t),X
0(t),DVν1(t,X
0(t)))− h(t, ν2(t),X0(t), α0ν2(t),DVν1(t,X0(t)))
]
dt
+ g(ν1(T ),X
0(T ))− g(ν2(T ),X0(T ))
]
. (3.34)
By the definition of the H and the form of f in Assumption 3.2 we get,
h(s, ν1(s),X
0(s), α0ν1(s),DVν2(s,X
0(s)))
≥ H(s, ν1(s),X0(s),DVν2(s,X0(s)))
= f0(s, ν1(s),X
0(s)) + f1(s,X
0(s), α0ν2(s)) +DVν2(s,X
0(s))bˆν2(s)
where the last equality uses the observation that since αˆ(s, η, x, p) does not depend on η,
αˆ(s, ν1(s),X
0(s),DVν2(s,X
0(s))) = α0ν2(s). Therefore for all s ∈ [0, T ],
h(s, ν1(s),X
0(s), α0ν1(s),DVν2(s,X
0(s)))−H(s, ν2(s),X0(s),DVν2(s,X0(s)))
≥ f0(s, ν1(s),X0(s))− f0(s, ν2(s),X0(s)), (3.35)
Similarly for all s ∈ [0, T ],
H(s, ν1(s),X
0(s),DVν1(s,X
0(s)))− h(s, ν2(s),X0(s), α0ν2(s),DVν1(s,X0(s)))
≤ f0(s, ν1(s),X0(s))− f0(s, ν2(s),X0(s)). (3.36)
Applying the last two inequalities to (3.33) and (3.34), we get
0 ≤ [Eν2 − Eν1 ]
[
g(ν1(T ),X
0(T ))− g(ν2(T ),X0(T )) (3.37)
+
∫ T
0
[f0(s, ν1(s),X
0(s))− f0(s, ν2(s),X0(s))]ds
]
.
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Until now ν1 and ν2 were arbitrary measures in M0. Suppose now that νi, i = 1, 2, are fixed
points of Φ. Then, for i = 1, 2, Pνi◦(X0)−1 = νi and so for all s ∈ [0, T ], Pνi◦(X0(s))−1 = νi(s).
In this case, using the inequalities in Assumption 3.2 we get that the inequality (3.37) can be
replaced with equality. We claim that α0ν1 = α
0
ν2 , λ
0
T × P-a.s. Indeed, suppose that there is a
set with positive λ0T × P-measure on which α0ν1 6= α0ν2 . Then on this set (3.35) and (3.36) will
hold with strict inequalities by Assumption 3.1 (b). Since the measures P, Pν1 , and Pν2 are
equivalent, this will say that (3.37) holds with a strict inequality as well, which contradicts the
equality that was established above. This proves the claim. Since b(t, η, x, u) does not depend
on η we conclude from the equality of α0ν1 and α
0
ν2 that bˆν1(t,X
0(t, ω)) = bˆν2(t,X
0(t, ω)),
λ0T × P-a.s. and thus by (3.29), Pν1 = Pν2 . Combining this with the fact that νi are fixed
points of Φ, we now have ν1 = P
ν1 ◦ (X0)−1 = Pν2 ◦ (X0)−1 = ν2. ✷
4 Asymptotic Nash equilibrium
The main result of this section is Theorem 4.1. The main idea in the proof is to use a solution ν¯
to the MFG (which from Theorem 3.1 exists under Assumption 3.1) and the associated feedback
control given by Proposition 3.1 in order to construct an admissible control α˜n = {α˜n,i}ni=1
for the n-player game. Specifically, the control will be given in a feedback form through the
following relation
α˜n,i(t)
.
= αˆ(t, ν¯(t), Q˜n,i(t),DVν¯(t, Q˜
n,i(t))), (4.1)
where Q˜n,i is the corresponding scaled queue length under the feedback control. Note that
the only information each of the players uses is its own state. Therefore, the problem is
decentralized in the sense that players do not need to observe each others’ states. Our main
condition, in addition to Assumption 3.1, for {α˜n} to be an asymptotic Nash equilibrium is
the following. It in particular says that the drift function does not depend on the mean-field
term. Fix η0 ∈ P([0, L]).
Assumption 4.1
(a) For every t ∈ [0, T ], η ∈ P([0, L]), x ∈ [0, L], and α ∈ U , one has,
b(t, η, x, α) = b(t, η0, x, α);
(b) There exists x ∈ [0, L] such that for every i ∈ N,
lim
n→∞ Q˜
n,i(0) = x. (4.2)
As before, with an abuse of notation, we will write b(t, η, x, α) as b(t, x, α) when Assumption
4.1 holds. As discussed in Remark 3.1, part (a) of the assumption means that the empirical
measure affects the drift only through the control, which in turn is affected by the empirical
measure through the running cost.
Recall the probability space (Ω′,F ′,P′) from Section 2.1. Let for n ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ] and
i = 1, · · · , n, βn(t) : Ω′ → U be such that
α˜n−i = {α˜n,1, . . . , α˜n,i−1, βn, α˜n,i+1, . . . , α˜n,n}
is an admissible control (i.e. α˜n−i ∈ Un). The following is the main result of the section.
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Theorem 4.1 Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold. Let ν¯, α˜n and α˜n−i, i = 1, . . . , n, n ∈ N
be as introduced above. Then
lim sup
n→∞
Jn,1(Q˜n(0); α˜n) = Vν¯(0, x) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ J
n,1(Q˜n(0); α˜n−i). (4.3)
Theorem 4.1 in particular says that for every ε > 0, there is n ∈ N sufficiently large such that
α˜n forms an ε-Nash equilibrium in the n-player game.
The proof is given in the next three sections. First in Section 4.1 (Proposition 4.1) we
will prove the convergence of empirical measures of the scaled queue length processes under
controls α˜n and α˜n−i to ν¯. Next, in Section 4.2 (Proposition 4.2) we will prove the first equality
in (4.3) and finally Proposition 4.3 in Section 4.3 will prove the inequality in (4.3).
4.1 Convergence of empirical measures
Let for i ∈ N, α˜n−i ∈ Un be as defined below Assumption 4.1. Let
ν˜n−i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δQ˜n,j ,
where Q˜n,j is the controlled queue length process defined by (2.5) with αn replaced with α˜n−i.
The following result gives the convergence of ν˜n−i to ν¯.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold. Then for every i ∈ N, ν˜n−i converges
in probability, in P(D([0, T ] : [0, L])), to ν¯ as n→∞.
Proof: Without loss of generality we assume that i = 1. Recall that for j ∈ N, Q˜n,j is defined
by (2.5) with αn replaced with α˜n−1. Define
ζ˜n,i(t) = Q˜n,i(0) + A˜n,i(t)− D˜n,i(t) +
∫ t
0
b˜n,i(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
where A˜n,i, D˜n,i are as in (2.3). Define for i = 1, . . . , n,
G˜n,i
.
= (ζn,i, Q˜n,i, Y˜ n,i, R˜n,i)
and let
Ξn
.
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
δG˜n,i .
Note that since by assumption {Q˜n,i(0)}ni=1 are exchangeable and the controls α˜n,i are given
in terms of the same feedback function αˆ for each i = 2, . . . , n, the processes {G˜n,i}ni=2 are
exchangeable. Defining G˜n,i to be the zero process for i > n we can regard, G˜n
.
= {G˜n,i}∞i=2
as a random variable with values in D([0, T ] : (R4)⊗∞). We now argue the tightness of the
sequence {G˜n}. It suffices to show for each i, the tightness of {G˜n,i}n∈N in D([0, T ] : R4). Since
sup
n,i,ω
sup
t∈[0,T ]
λn,i(t, ω) + µn,i(t, ω)
en
.
= C0 <∞, (4.4)
the following two conditions are satisfied with Xn equal to 〈A˜n,i, A˜n,j〉 and 〈D˜n,i, D˜n,j〉 for all
i, j.
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[A] For each ε > 0, η > 0 there exists a δ > 0 and n0 ∈ N with the property that for every
family of stopping times {τn}n∈N (τn being an Ft-stopping time on (Ω′,F ′,P′)) with
τn ≤ T − δ,
sup
n≥n0
sup
θ≤δ
P{‖Xn(τn)−Xn(τn + θ)‖ ≥ η} ≤ ε.
[T1] For every t in some dense subset of [0, T ], {Xn(t)}n∈N is a tight sequence of R valued
random variables.
Then by Rebolledo’s theorem (see [49, Theorem 2.3.2]) {A˜n,i}n≥1 and {D˜n,i}n≥1 are tight in
D([0, T ] : R) for each i. Also since the jumps of A˜n,i and D˜n,i are of size 1/√en, these processes
are C-tight (namely all weak limit points are continuous a.s.). From boundedness of b we see
that {∫ ·0 b˜n,i(s)ds}n∈N is tight in C([0, T ] : R). Combining this with Assumption 4.1(b) we
see that {ζn,i}n∈N is C-tight in D([0, T ] : R). Using now the continuity of the Skorohod map
(Lemma 2.1) we have the desired tightness of {G˜n,i}n∈N.
Suppose now that, along some subsequence, G˜n converges to G˜
.
= (ζ i, Q˜i, Y˜ i, R˜i), in dis-
tribution, in D([0, T ] : (R4)⊗∞). Then G˜ ∈ C([0, T ] : (R4)⊗∞) a.s. and from [50, Lemma
4.2] and the exchangeability of {G˜n,i}ni=2 it follows that {G˜i}∞i=2 is exchangeable and(along the
subsequence),
(G˜n,Ξn)⇒ (G˜,Ξ) (4.5)
in D([0, T ] : (R4)⊗∞)× P(D([0, T ] : R4)) where Ξ .= limm→∞ 1m−1
∑m
i=2 δG˜i .
We will now characterize the distribution of {Q˜i}. From tightness of {Y˜ n,i}n∈N and
{R˜n,i}n∈N argued above and (2.6) it follows that
1
en
∫ t
0
1{Q˜n,i(s)=0}µ
n,i(s)ds→ 0, and 1
en
∫ t
0
1{Q˜n,i(s)=L}λ
n,i(s)ds→ 0,
uniformly on [0, T ], in probability. Also, from (2.1) it follows that
sup
0≤t≤T
[∣∣∣∣λn,i(t)en − λˆ
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣µn,i(t)en − µˆ
∣∣∣∣
]
→ 0 a.s.
as n→∞. Thus from (2.4) (and the relation λˆ = µˆ), for all i, j,
〈A˜n,i, A˜n,j〉(t)→ δij λˆ, 〈D˜n,i, D˜n,j〉(t)→ δij λˆ, 〈A˜n,i, D˜n,j〉(t)→ 0
in probability, uniformly on [0, T ], as n → ∞. By standard martingale techniques it now
follows that
{A˜n,i − D˜n,i}i≥1 ⇒ {σBi}i≥1,
in D([0, T ] : R∞), where {Bi} are mutually independent standard Brownian motions. Also,
since for i ≥ 2
(Q˜n,i, Y˜ n,i, R˜n,i)(t) = Γ
(
Q˜n,i(0) +
∫ ·
0
b˜n,i(s)ds + A˜n,i(·)− D˜n,i(·) + o(1)
)
(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
where
b˜n,i(t) = b(t, Q˜n,i(t), αˆ(t, ν¯(t), Q˜n,i(t),DVν¯(t, Q˜
n,i(t)))),
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we have from the continuity of b (Assumption 3.1), αˆ, and DVν¯ , for i ≥ 2,
(Q˜i, Y˜ i, R˜i)(t) = Γ
(
x+
∫ ·
0
b(t, Q˜i(t), αˆ(t, ν¯(t), Q˜i(t),DVν¯(t, Q˜
i(t))))dt + σBi(·)
)
(t). (4.6)
Once again using standard martingale arguments it follows that for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , Bi(t)−Bi(s)
is independent of σ{(Q˜i(u), R˜i(u), Y˜ i(u), Bi(u)) : u ≤ s}. From weak uniqueness property
noted in Section 3.2 and the fact that ν¯ is a fixed point of Φ we now have that Q˜i has
distribution ν¯ for i = 2, 3, · · · . Using the fact that {Bi} are mutually independent, a simple
argument based on Girsanov’s theorem shows that {Q˜i} are mutually independent as well.
This characterize the distribution of {Q˜i}i≥2 as ν¯⊗∞. We now have from (4.5), the definition
of Ξ, and the law of large numbers that
lim
n→∞ ν˜
n
−i = limn→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
δQ˜n,i = limn→∞
1
n− 1
n∑
i=2
δQ˜n,i = limm→∞
1
m− 1
m∑
i=2
δQ˜i = ν¯.
The result follows. ✷
Remark 4.1 The above proof also shows that if α˜n−1 = α˜
n, namely βn = α˜n,1, then (4.6) holds
for all i ≥ 1 and the law of {Q˜i}i≥1 is ν¯⊗∞.
4.2 Same strategy for all players
In this section we prove the equality in (4.3).
Proposition 4.2 Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 are satisfied. Let α˜n = {α˜n,i}∞i=1 be as in
(4.1). Then for all i ≥ 1
lim
n→∞J
n,i(Q˜n(0); α˜n) = Vν¯(0, x). (4.7)
Proof: Without loss of generality we assume i = 1. From the proof of Proposition 4.1 (see
Remark 4.1)
(Q˜n,1, Y˜ n,1, R˜n,1)⇒ (Q˜1, Y˜ 1, R˜1)
where the processes on the right side are given through (4.6) with i = 1. Let
αˆ(t, ν¯(t), Q˜1(t),DVν¯(t, Q˜
1(t)))
.
= γ(t, Q˜1(t)), t ∈ [0, T ].
Recall that f and g are bounded continuous functions and from Proposition 4.1 we have that,
for every t ∈ [0, T ],
(ν˜n(t), Q˜n,1(t), αn,1(t))⇒ (ν¯(t), Q˜1(t), γ(t, Q˜1(t))).
This shows that
E
[∫ T
0
f(t, ν˜n(t), Q˜n,1(t), αn,1(t))dt+ g(ν˜n(T ), Q˜n,1(T ))
]
→ E
[∫ T
0
f(t, ν¯(t), Q˜1(t), γ(t, Q˜1(t)))dt+ g(ν¯(T ), Q˜1(T ))
]
. (4.8)
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Also by continuity of y and r(
y(·, ν˜n(·)), r(·, ν˜n(·)), Y˜ n,1(·), R˜n,1(·)
)
⇒
(
y(·, ν¯(·)), r(·, ν¯(·)), Y˜ 1(·), R˜1(·)
)
in D([0, T ] : R4). It then follows (cf. [31, Lemma 2.4])
(∫ T
0
y(t, ν˜n(t))dY˜ n,1(t),
∫ T
0
r(t, ν˜n(t))dR˜n,1(t)
)
⇒
(∫ T
0
y(t, ν¯(t))dY˜ 1(t),
∫ T
0
r(t, ν¯(t))dR˜1(t)
)
(4.9)
as n→∞. Also from Lemma 2.1,
E
[
(Y˜ n,1(T ))2 + (R˜n,1(T ))2
]
≤ c2SE
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|ζ˜n,1(s)|2
]
. (4.10)
Next note that
E sup
0≤t≤T
(A˜n,1(t))2 ≤ 4 1
en
∫ T
0
λn,1(s)ds ≤ 4C0T,
where C0 is as in (4.4). Similarly, E sup0≤t≤T (D˜n,1(t))2 ≤ 4C0T . Combining these estimates
sup
n
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|ζ˜n,1(s)|2
]
<∞
which combined with (4.9) and the boundedness of y, r implies
sup
n
E
[∫ T
0
y(t, ν˜n(t))dY˜ n,1(t) +
∫ T
0
r(t, ν˜n(t))dR˜n,1(t)
]2
<∞.
Combining this with the weak convergence in (4.9) we have
E
[∫ T
0
y(t, ν˜n(t))dY˜ n,1(t) +
∫ T
0
r(t, ν˜n(t))dR˜n,1(t)
]
→ E
[∫ T
0
y(t, ν¯(t))dY˜ 1(t) +
∫ T
0
r(t, ν¯(t))dR˜1(t)
]
. (4.11)
Combining (4.8) and (4.11) and recalling from the optimality of αˆ that
Vν¯(0, x) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(t, ν¯(t), Q˜1(t), αˆ(t, ν¯(t), Q˜1(t),DVν¯(t, Q˜
1)))dt+ g(ν¯(T ), Q˜1(T )) (4.12)
+
∫ T
0
y(t, ν¯(t))dY˜ 1(t) +
∫ T
0
r(t, ν¯(t))dR˜1(t)
]
,
we have the desired convergence limn→∞ Jn,1(Q˜n(0); α˜n) = Vν¯(0, x). ✷
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4.3 Deviation of Player 1
In this section we prove the inequality on the right side of (4.3).
Proposition 4.3 Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold. Let ν¯, βn, α˜n−i be as introduced at
the beginning of Section 4. Then for each i ≥ 1
lim inf
n→∞ J
n,1(Q˜n(0); α˜n−i) ≥ Vν¯(0, x). (4.13)
Proof: As before, we assume without loss of generality that i = 1. We will need to argue the
tightness of the control sequence {βn} in an appropriate space. For this it will be convenient
to consider a relaxed control formulation. Consider the relaxation of the stochastic control
problem in (3.1)–(3.3) where the control space U is replaced by P(U), the drift function b is
replaced by the function bR : [0, T ]× [0, L] ×P(U)→ R defined as
bR(t, x, r)
.
=
∫
U
b(t, x, u)r(du), (t, x, r) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, L]× P(U),
and the running cost function f is replaced by fR : [0, T ] × P([0, L]) × [0, L] × P(U) → R,
defined as
fR(t, η, x, r)
.
=
∫
U
f(t, η, x, u)r(du), (t, η, x, r) ∈ [0, T ]× P([0, L]) × [0, L]× P(U).
Also, the class of admissible controls A(Ξ, t, x, ν¯) is replaced by AR(Ξ, t, x, ν¯) of pairs (αR, Z)
that are similar to pairs (α,Z) introduced above (3.1) except that αR is P(U) valued rather
than U valued and (3.1) holds with b¯(u) = b(u,X(u), α(u)) replaced with bR(u,X(u), αR(u)).
The corresponding cost function Jν¯,R is defined by (3.2) with f replaced by fR. The value
function in this relaxed formulation, denoted as Vν¯,R, is given by (3.3) with A replaced by AR.
Define the function hR by (3.7), replacing (f, b) with (fR, bR). Then, from Assumption 3.1(b),
H(t, η, x, p) = inf
u∈U
h(t, η, x, u, p) = inf
r∈P(U)
hR(t, η, x, r, p).
This shows that Vν and Vν,R are both solutions of the PDE (3.5) - (3.6). In view of the
uniqueness result from Proposition 3.1, Vν = Vν,R.
Let βnR(t)
.
= δβn(t), t ∈ [0, T ] and define β¯nR ∈ M(U × [0, T ]) as
β¯nR(du dt)
.
= βnR(t)(du)dt,
where M(U × [0, T ]) is the space of finite measures on U × [0, T ] equipped with the topology
of weak convergence. Then we can rewrite
Jn,1(Q˜n(0), α˜n−1)
.
=E
[ ∫
U×[0,T ]
f(t, ν˜n(t), Q˜n,1(t), u)β¯nR(du dt) + g(ν˜
n(T ), Q˜n,1(T )) (4.14)
+
∫ T
0
y(t, ν˜n(t))dY˜ n,1(t) +
∫ T
0
r(t, ν˜n(t))dR˜n,1(t)
]
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and
(Q˜n,1, Y˜ n,1, R˜n,1) = Γ
(
Q˜n,1(0) +
∫
U×[0,·]
b(s, Q˜n,1(s), u)β¯nR(du ds) + A˜
n,i(·) − D˜n,i(·) + o(1)
)
.
(4.15)
From Proposition 4.1, ν˜n ⇒ ν¯. Also, the arguments of the same proposition show that{
Q˜n,1(·), A˜n,1(·)− D˜n,1(·),
∫
U×[0,·]
b(s, Q˜n,1(s), u)β¯nR(du ds)
}
n∈N
(4.16)
are C-tight in D([0, T ] : R3). Furthermore, since U × [0, T ] is compact and β¯nR(U × [0, T ]) = T ,
the sequence {β¯nR}n∈N is tight in M(U × [0, T ]). Suppose now that along a subsequence
(labeled once more as {n}) the sequence in (4.16) along with {β¯nR} converges in distribution
to (Q˜1, σB1, ϑ, β¯R). Then from the Lipschitz property of b (Assumption 3.1(a)) we have, for
t ∈ [0, T ],
ϑ(t) =
∫
U×[0,t]
b(s, Q˜1(s), u)β¯R(duds)
=
∫ t
0
bR(s, Q˜1(s), βR(s))ds,
where βR(s) is obtained by disintegrating β¯, i.e. β¯R(du ds) = βR(s)(du)ds. Also as in the
proof of Proposition 4.1 it can be argued that B1 is a standard Brownian motion and thus we
can conclude as in the proof of (4.6)
Z˜(t) ≡ (Q˜1, Y˜ 1, R˜1)(t) = Γ
(
x+
∫ ·
0
bR(t, Q˜1(t), βR(t))dt+ σB1(·)
)
(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.17)
Once again, by a standard martingale argument, one can argue that for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
B1(t)−B1(s) is independent of
F˜s .= σ
{
Q˜1(s′), Y˜ 1(s′), R˜1(s′), β¯R(A× [0, s′]) : 0 ≤ s′ ≤ s, A ∈ B(U)
}
.
Thus denoting by (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) the probability space on which the limit processes are defined,
Ξ = (Ω˜, F˜ , {F˜t}, P˜, B1) is a system and (β¯R, Z˜) ∈ AR(Ξ, 0, x, ν¯). Exactly as in the proof of
Proposition 4.2 we see that the convergence in (4.11) holds. Also using the weak convergence
(ν˜n, Q˜n,1, β¯nR)⇒ (ν¯, Q˜1, β¯R)
and the Lipschitz property of f in Assumption 3.1, we have
E
[∫
U×[0,T ]
f(t, ν˜n(t), Q˜n,1(t), u)β¯nR(du dt) + g(ν˜
n(T ), Q˜n,1(T ))
]
→ E
[∫ T
0
f(t, ν¯(t), Q˜1(t), u)β¯R(du dt) + g(ν¯(T ), Q˜1(T ))
]
. (4.18)
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Combining the above convergence properties, we have as n→∞,
Jn,1(Q˜n(0), α˜n−1)→ Jν¯,R(0, x, β¯R, Z˜) ≥ Vν¯,R(0, x) = Vν¯(0, x).
Since the above holds for an arbitrary convergent subsequence of processes in (4.16) and the
sequence {β¯nR}, the result follows. ✷
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